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Contract theory claims that renegotiation prevents from reaching the informationally con-
strained efficient solution that could have been obtained under full commitment. Assessing
the cost of renegotiation compared to the full commitment scenario still remains an open is-
sue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural principal-agent
model with renegotiation on a set of contracts for urban transport services. The model captures
two important features of the industry. First, only two types of contracts are used in practice
(fixed-price and cost-plus). Second, subsidies are greater when a cost-plus contract was signed
earlier on than following a fixed-price contract. We then compare a scenario with renegotiation
and a hypothetical situation with full commitment. We conclude that the welfare gains from
improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators.
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Real world regulatory relationships are ongoing processes in changing environ-
ments. Parties lay down arrangements for trading goods and services covering several
periods. However, they often recontract as new information on market demand and
costs structure becomes available. Although economic theory has devoted consider-
able attention to understanding dynamic contractual relationships and especially how
contracts are renegotiated over time, the empirical literature on those issues lags much
behind both in terms of volume and scope.
Contract theory claims that, under a variety of circumstances, renegotiation im-
poses various transaction costs. Although renegotiation improves contracting ex post,
it has also perverse effects on the parties’ ex ante incentives.1 Overall, those costs pre-
vent those parties from reaching the informationally constrained efficient solution that
could have been achieved under full commitment. Yet, an open issue from an empirical
viewpoint remains to assess the welfare losses associated with renegotiation. Further-
more, another important question especially from a policy perspective is to evaluate
the distribution of these losses among contracting parties.
Indeed, making progresses on these fronts is crucial, especially for practitioners
who are eager to evaluate the performances of various contractual arrangements found
in real-world practices. In this respect, the French urban transportation sector offers a
particularly attractive field for study. Motivated by a concern for improving ex ante
competition among potential operators, the 1993 Transportation Law imposed that
franchise contracts must be re-auctioned and ‘re-negotiated’ (in a sense to be discussed
later) every 5 years by public authorities in charge of regulating transport operators.
Since then, practitioners have repeatedly complained that this institutional constraint
on contract duration is too tight. Expectations that welfare gains could be achieved
by increasing contract duration is at the source of an ongoing political debate and has
often been considered as a justification of the operators’ political activism.
Motivation. This paper has two main objectives. First, we construct and estimate a
structural principal-agent model of contract renegotiation in the French urban trans-
1Such perverse incentives arise in at least three occasions. First, information may be incorporated in
contract design only at a slow pace as in the literature on adverse-selection under imperfect commit-
ment (Dewatripont, 1989, Hart and Tirole, 1988, Laffont and Tirole, 1993-Chapter 10, Rey and Salanié,
1996, Laffont and Martimort, 2002-Chapter 9, among others). Second, the threat of regulatory hold-up
may impede specific investments which requires costly governance and various safeguards (Williamson,
1985). Finally optimal risk-sharing arrangements may be disrupted (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990). Only
the first of these impediments to contracting will be investigated in this paper.
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port sector. A basic assumption of this model is that contracting takes place under
asymmetric information: Operators are privately informed on their innate costs at the
time of contracting with public authorities. Second, we use those estimates in a coun-
terfactual experiment whose goal is to recover not only the welfare gains but also their
distribution if full commitment were feasible. These gains are significant although un-
evenly distributed: Operators would be net winners whereas taxpayers/consumers
would lose had contract length been extended.
Our model accounts for an important feature of the industry. In practice, only two
kinds of contracts are used by local public authorities (principals) to regulate the ser-
vice: cost-plus and fixed-price contracts. It is well-known from Laffont and Tirole
(1993, Chapter 1), Rogerson (1987), Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) and
Mookherjee and Reichelstein (2001) that menus of linear contracts might facilitate self-
selection of operators.2 Of much importance from a practical point of view, these
menus approximate quite well and sometimes replicate what more complex optimal
nonlinear contracts would do.3 In that respect, Rogerson (2003) pointed out that, in
most real-world procurement contexts, a menu with only two items (i.e., one cost-plus
and one fixed-price contracts) is enough to achieve much of the gains from trade, even
under asymmetric information.4
A second important feature of the urban transportation sector is that subsidies (or
‘compensations’ as they are often referred to by practitioners) proposed to operators in-
crease over time, no matter the characteristics of the service. Our theoretical model
provides a rationale for such patterns. Increasing subsidies result from the local au-
thorities’ limited ability to commit and the fact that information on the operator’s cost
structure is revealed over time. This point is familiar from the agency literature on
limited commitment.5 However, it is revisited here in an institutional context where
2In addition, linear contracts also have nice robustness properties under cost uncertainty (Laffont
and Tirole 1993-Chapter 1 p.109, and Caillaud, Guesnerie and Rey, 1992).
3Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 1) showed that a convex optimal nonlinear cost reimbursement
rule can be implemented with a menu of linear contracts. Wilson (1993) and McAfee (2002) demon-
strated that such menus might already fare well even when restricted to a few items.
4More specifically, Rogerson (2003) supposed that the firm’s innate cost which is its private informa-
tion is uniformly distributed and showed that this simple menu can secure three-fourth of the surplus
that an optimal contract would achieve. Chu and Sappington (2007) challenged this result beyond the
case of a uniform distribution. On a related note, Schmalensee (1989), Reichelstein (1992), Bower (1993),
and Gasmi, Laffont and Sharkey (1999) investigated the value of relying on a single linear contract and
concluded also on the good welfare performances achieved with such a rough contract design.
5Dewatripont (1989) and Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 10) among others.
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only menus with two options (fixed-price/cost-plus) are feasible. Whereas the exist-
ing theoretical literature on limited commitment has focused on discrete type models
to derive fully optimal renegotiation-proof contracts but is often criticized for its lack
of tractability, we import much of the tractability of Rogerson (2003)’s model into a
dynamic framework where contracts are renegotiated over time.6 So doing, we look
for a theoretical modeling consistent with our data set. In particular, it is a prerequi-
site to consider a continuum of types for evaluating a meaningful distribution of cost
parameters in our empirical model and neatly characterize the probabilities of vari-
ous contractual regimes (cost-plus, fixed-price, and moves over time from cost-plus to
fixed-price contracts).
Empirical analysis. The theoretical model readily boils down to an econometric set-up
whose parameters are estimated under a scenario where renegotiation takes place. To
understand the source of estimation bias that would arise had we wrongly assumed
full commitment, it is useful to come back on the basic intuition underlying the trade-
off between ex post efficiency and ex ante incentives that appears under renegotiation.
To be acceptable, renegotiation must raise subsidies so that even operators which are
only mildly efficient may end up choosing fixed-price contracts. These efficiency gains
also give more rents to the most efficient operators who enjoy increased subsidies.
From a welfare point of view, renegotiation is thus more attractive when the social
value of the operators’ effort in cutting costs is greater. Only in this case, the efficiency
gains from renegotiation dominate its costs in terms of extra rents. Wrongly assuming
full commitment when analyzing our data would thus amount to underestimate the
social value of effort and overestimate information rents.
Our empirical analysis yields two main results. First, it provides an estimate of the
congruence of objectives between the operator and the local government in charge of
regulating the service. The operator’s bargaining power when negotiating contracts
depends on political preferences. Right-wing municipalities are more prone to favor
private operators than left-wing ones.7
Second, using our estimates of the operator’s innate cost distributions and other
parameters of the model, we evaluate the welfare gains that would be obtained when
6The static analysis in Rogerson (2003) cannot cover the rich dynamic patterns observed in our data
set, in particular the move towards fixed-price contracts as time passes.
7Kalt and Zupan (1984, 1990) provided evidence on the fact that policymakers’ ideology may have a
significant impact on regulatory outcome.
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moving to the full commitment solution. The intertemporal subsidies under full com-
mitment are higher than under renegotiation, so that taxpayers are net losers from a
hypothetical increase in contract length. However, the welfare gains are significant.
Taxpayers bear an increase in tax burden of 8 million Euros whereas operators see
their rent increase by roughly 8.2 million Euros. This provides a strong rationale for
the operators’ lobbying effort towards increasing contract duration.
Literature review. Our model belongs to the recent empirical literature on regulatory
contracts. First, as already explained, this paper contributes to the ongoing empiri-
cal debate on the value of using simple menus of contracts. In a pioneering paper,
Wolak (1994) estimated the production function of a Californian water utility, and ar-
gued that complex nonlinear regulatory mechanisms à la Baron and Myerson (1982)
are used. Assuming instead that costs are observable as in Laffont and Tirole (1993),
Gasmi, Laffont and Sharkey (1997), Brocas, Chan and Perrigne (2006) and Perrigne
and Vuong (2007) considered also such complex regulatory schemes to estimate costs
and demand parameters of structural models. Other empirical studies have instead ar-
gued that such complex mechanisms might not be so useful. Bajari and Tadelis (2001)
focused on the private construction industry in the U.S. and noticed that most contracts
are either cost-plus or fixed-price. The reason for such restricted menus is that public
authorities face a trade off between providing ex ante incentives with fixed-price con-
tracts and avoiding ex post transaction costs due to costly renegotiation with cost-plus
arrangements. Considering contracts in the automobile insurance industry, Chiappori
and Salanié (2000) restricted the analysis to menus with only two types of coverage. In
the field of transportation, Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) focused on the incentive effects
of cost-plus and fixed-price contracts. They measured actual welfare related to real reg-
ulatory practices, and compared this measure to what would have been achieved with
more complex mechanisms. We instead model contract design in a dynamic context.
In that respect, our paper is also related to Dionne and Doherty (1994). These au-
thors focused on the car insurance industry in California and suggested that insurers
may use long-term contracts to enhance efficiency and attract portfolios of low-risk
drivers. Our empirical analysis shows the extent to which long-term contracts may
benefit not only principals (hereafter public authorities) but also agents (operators).
Organization of the paper. Section 1 provides an overview of the French urban trans-
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portation sector. Section 2 presents our theoretical model and characterizes the opti-
mal menu of contracts (fixed-prices/cost-plus) both under full commitment and rene-
gotiation. Section 3 develops our empirical method. Section 4 evaluates the welfare
gains when moving to full commitment and their distribution between operators and
taxpayers. Section 5 discusses other potential hypothesis explaining the pattern of sub-
sidies observed in practice. Section 6 highlights alleys for further research.8
1 The French Urban Transportation Industry
As in most countries around the world, urban transportation in France is a regulated
activity. In each urban area of significant size endowed with a transport network, a
local authority (a city, a group of cities or a district) contracts with a single operator to
provide the transport service. Regulatory rules prevent the presence of several suppli-
ers on the same network. A distinguishing feature of France compared to most other
OECD countries is that, in 2002, about eighty percent of local operators are private and
are owned by three large companies, two of them being private while the third one is
semi-public.9 These companies, defined by their respective ownership structures and
market shares (in terms of number of networks operated) were: KEOLIS (private, 30%),
TRANSDEV (semi-public, 19%), CONNEX (private, 25%). In addition there are a small
private group, AGIR, and a few public firms fully controlled by local governments.
1.1 Economic Environment
The 1982 Transportation Law establishes a decentralized decision-making process con-
cerning the local transport policy and provides regulatory guidelines. Each local au-
thority now organizes its own transportation system by setting route and fare struc-
tures, capacity, quality of service, conditions for subsidizing the service, levels of in-
vestment and ownership nature. The local authority may operate the network directly
or it may rely on an operator. In this case, a formal contract defines the regulatory rules
that the operator must follow as well as a cost-reimbursement scheme.10
8Proofs of the theoretical results are relegated to an Appendix.
9For an overview of the regulation of urban transportation systems in the different countries of the
European Union, the United States and Japan, see IDEI (1999).
10Since 1993, ‘beauty contests’ are required to allocate the building and management of new infrastruc-
tures for urban transportation when the date for contract renewal comes. However, very few networks
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In most urban areas, operating costs are on average twice as high as commercial
revenues. Budgets are rarely balanced without subsidies. One reason is that operators
face universal service obligations and must operate in low demand areas. Low prices
are maintained to ensure affordable access to all consumers of public transportation.
Moreover, special fares are given to targeted groups like seniors and students. Subsi-
dies come from the State’s budget, the local authority’s budget, and a special tax paid
by local firms (employing more than nine full-time workers).
Undertaking a welfare analysis of regulatory schemes requires a database that en-
compasses both the performance and the organization of the French urban transport
industry. The basic idea is to consider each system in an urban area during a time pe-
riod as a realization of a regulatory contract. Such a database was created in the early
1980s from an annual survey conducted by the Centre d’Etude et de Recherche du Trans-
port Urbain (CERTU, Lyon) with the support of the Groupement des Autorités Respon-
sables du Transport (GART, Paris), a nationwide trade organization that gathers most
of the local authorities in charge of a urban transport network. This rich source is a
unique tool for comparing regulatory systems both across space and over time. For
homogeneity purposes, we have selected all urban areas of more than 100,000 inhabi-
tants. Indeed, smaller cities may entail service and network characteristics that differ
significantly from those in bigger urban areas. Discarding these smaller cities allows us
to identify in a more satisfactory manner differences in inefficiencies and cost-reducing
activities across operators. The sample does not include the largest networks of France,
i.e., Paris, Lyon and Marseille, as they are not surveyed. Overall, the panel data set cov-
ers 49 different urban transport networks over the period 1987-2001. Note finally that
we only focus on transport networks where the operator is a private entity. This rules
out the so-called Régies municipales where the service is fully integrated within the city
administration, like in Paris or Marseille, as these cases are not concerned with the
principal-agent problem at the heart of our investigation.
have changed operators from one regulatory period to the other until recently. Documentary investi-
gations shed light on the fact that awarding transport operations through tenders does not necessarily
foster ex ante competition since most local authorities usually receive bids from only one firm, namely
the operator which is already in charge. Several reasons might explain this phenomenon. First, local
authorities are either reluctant to implement the law or do not have enough expertise to launch complex
calls for tender. Second, the three groups owning most of the urban operators in France are located on
specific geographical areas which restricts competition. Finally, these groups also operate other munic-
ipal services such as water distribution or garbage collection, which makes it even harder for public
authorities to credibly punish operators following bad performances.
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We assume that the network operator has private information about its innate tech-
nology (adverse selection) and that its cost-reducing effort is non-observable (moral
hazard). Because French local authorities exercise their new powers on transportation
policy since the enactment of the 1982 Law only, and since they usually face stringent fi-
nancial constraints, their limited auditing capacities is recognized among practitioners.
A powerful and well-performed audit system needs effort, time and money. French
experts on urban transportation blame local authorities for being too lax in assessing
operating costs and often point at their lack of expertise.11 The number of buses re-
quired for a specific network, the costs incurred on each route, the fuel consumption of
buses (which is highly dependent on drivers’ skills), the drivers’ behavior toward cus-
tomers, the effect of traffic congestion on costs, are all aspects for which operators have
much more data and a better understanding than public authorities. This suggests the
presence of adverse selection on the innate technology in the first place. Given the
technical complexity of these issues, it should be even harder for the local authority to
assess whether and to what extent operators undertake efforts to provide appropriate
and efficient management. Moral hazard naturally arises on top of the adverse selec-
tion problem. When compounded, those informational asymmetries play a crucial role
in the design of contractual arrangements and financial objectives.12, 13
11The French urban transport expert O. Domenach has argued that “the regulator is not able of determin-
ing the number of buses which is necessary to run the network. The same comment can be made regarding the
fuel consumption of each bus. The regulators are generally general practitioners instead of transport professionals.
Hence, the (re)negotiation of contracts between regulators and operators is not fair.” See Domenach (1987).
12Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) confirmed through a test that adverse selection and moral hazard are
two important features of the industry. They showed that a regulatory framework which encompasses
these two ingredients performs well to explain data.
13Three additional remarks should be made. First, private information on demand is not a relevant
issue in our industry. Local governments are well informed about the transportation needs of citizens.
The number of trips performed over a certain period is easily observed, and the regulator has a very
precise idea of how the socio-demographic characteristics of a urban area fluctuate over time. Second,
we do not address the issue of determining what should be the optimal rate-of-return on capital. The
rolling stock is owned by the local government for a vast majority of networks. In this case, the regulator
is responsible for renewing the vehicles, as well as guaranteeing a certain level of capital quality. Finally,
we rule out the possibility of risk sharing in the contractual relationships between the operators and the
regulators since the provision of transport services does entail relatively predictable cost fluctuations
for the operators. Uncertainty on costs and demand is potentially relevant in small networks but, as
suggested above, we focus only on big networks, i.e., those above 100,000 inhabitants.
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1.2 Regulatory Contracts
As already mentioned, two types of regulatory contracts are implemented in the French
urban transport industry. Fixed-price regimes are high-powered incentive schemes,
while cost-plus contracts do not provide any incentives for cost reduction. Over the
period of observation, fixed-price contracts are employed in 55.5% of the cases.
On average, contracts are signed for a period of 5 to 6 years, which in most cases
allows us to observe several regulatory arrangements for the same network. Overall,
we observe 136 different contracts. In the same network, the regulatory scheme may
switch from cost-plus to fixed-price or from fixed-price to cost-plus between two reg-
ulatory periods. We observe 20 changes of regulatory regimes, most of them (i.e., 17)
being switches from cost-plus to fixed-price regimes. These changes occur because the
same local authority may be willing to change regulatory rules, or because a new gov-
ernment is elected and changes the established rules. Note however that a change in
the political preference of the local government does not necessarily imply an early
renegotiation of the contract before its term. Newly elected local governments are in-
deed committed to the contracts signed by their predecessors. We detect 22 changes of
local governments in our database. Finally, as already suggested, very few changes of
operators are observed over our period of observation. Indeed, only 2 new operators
proposed services between 1987 and 2001.
An important feature of the industry is that the volume of subsidies paid to the
operator under a fixed-price regime depends on the contractual arrangement from
one period to another. Subsidies are higher for fixed-price regimes when a cost-plus
scheme is implemented in the previous period, compared to subsidies paid with a se-
ries of fixed-price schemes. To establish that this feature is present in the data, we run a
simple regression of the log subsidy paid on a set of covariates, which are the log num-
ber of vehicles in the operator’s rolling stock, the log size of the transport network in
kilometers, whether the observed regulator is right-wing or not, a dummy variable CF
indicating whether the observed fixed-price contract is implemented after a cost-plus
regime or not, and a set of firms fixed effects.14 The CF dummy is positive and sig-
nificant at the 1% level. On average, subsidies paid under fixed-price after a cost-plus
14Estimation results are (392 observations, firms fixed effects included, standard errors in parenthesis):
log Subsidy = 4.87
(0.26)
+ 0.68
(0.05)
log Rolling Stock + 0.23
(0.03)
log network − 0.11
(0.03)
Right-Wing + 0.34
(0.09)
CF.
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are 40.9% higher than those observed in the case of a sequence of fixed-price regimes.
The theoretical model below accounts for the features of the regulatory contracts used
in the French urban transportation industry and provides a rationale for the dynamic
patterns of subsidies.
2 Theoretical Model
The model adapts the lessons of the contracting literature under imperfect commit-
ment to the regulatory contracts just described. First, operators choose between fixed-
price or cost-plus contracts. Second, subsidies may increase over time. We argue below
that such patterns arise when contracts are renegotiation-proof. This positive model is
then compared to an hypothetical setting where regulators could commit but optimal
subsidies would then remain constant over time.
Generalizing the objective functions used in Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont
and Tirole (1993), the preferences of the local authority (the ‘principal’) are defined as:
W = S − (1 + λ)t(c) + αU
where S is the gross surplus generated by the service and U is the profit of the op-
erator.15 Subsidies t (c) raised by means of a distortionary taxation entail some dead-
weight loss that is captured by introducing a positive cost of public funds λ > 0.
The local government’s payment to the firm (the ‘agent’) depends on whether fixed-
price or cost-plus contracts are used. For a fixed-price contract, the principal offers a
fixed payment t(c) ≡ b for any realized cost c. With a cost-plus contract, the principal
reimburses the firm’s cost c and t(c) ≡ c for all c.
Public authorities might differ in terms of the weights left to the operator’s profit in
their objective functions. To have a meaningful trade-off between the dual objectives of
extracting the contractor’s information rent and inducing efficient cost-reducing effort,
we assume that α < 1 + λ so that, overall, one extra euro left to the firm is socially
costly. Various motivations might justify such preferences of local governments. The
parameter α might capture the firm’s bargaining power in tender offers and as such
15Implicitly, we consider a setting where the elasticity of demand is small which is a reasonable as-
sumption in the case of transportation in the medium term horizons we are considering here. In other
words, the surplus is basically constant. See Oum et al. (1992).
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reflect the level of ex ante competition among potential operators.16,17 In view of our
empirical study, we may also distinguish local governments according to their political
preferences. Rightist (resp. leftist) local governments commend more (resp. less) rent
for the private operator. This corresponds to higher values of α.
Turning to the cost structure, we follow Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 1) and
Rogerson (2003) in considering that the observable cost of one unit of the service c
blends together an adverse selection component θ, the innate efficiency of the service,
and a cost-reducing managerial effort e.18 We postulate the standard functional form:
c = θ − e.
Effort is costly for the firm’s management and the corresponding non-monetary disutil-
ity function ψ(e) is increasing and convex (ψ′ > 0, ψ′′ > 0) with ψ(0) = 0. The intrinsic
efficiency parameter θ is drawn once and for all before contracting from the interval
[θ, θ¯] according to the common knowledge cumulative distribution F (·) which has an
everywhere positive and atomless density f(·). Following the screening literature, we
assume that the monotone hazard rate property holds, R˙(θ) > 0 where R(θ) = F (θ)
f(θ)
so
that all optimization problems considered have quasi-concave objectives.19
With those notations in hand, we may as well write the firm’s profit as:
U = t(c)− c− ψ(e).
16In this sector, ex ante competition is not so fierce. Indeed, operators from different groups mostly
avoid head-to-head competition and generally bid for markets in distinct urban areas. The decision n0
05-D-38 of the French Conseil de la Concurrence shows that competition authorities are well-aware of this
downstream collusion between potential operators. In more than 60 % of cases, there is indeed only a
single bidder. This potential horizontal collusion is captured in ad hoc way in our framework through
the parameter α. The benefit of such an ad hoc specification of the intensity of potential downstream
competition comes from a better fit to the real-world practices while it fortunately eases the analysis of
the contractual dynamics.
17Following Baron (1989), Laffont (1996) and Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003), these preferences
might also result from a political equilibrium among various forces at the local level.
18In accordance with the lack of expertise in practice, we assume that the public authority has no
auditing capabilities and cannot check whether high costs are due to high innate inefficiency or to low
efforts. Adding the possibility of audit would relax incentive problems and making higher power in-
centives (i.e., fixed-price contracts) more attractive (Baron and Besanko, 1984a, Laffont and Tirole, 1993-
Chapter 12, and Khalil, 1997).
19For the sake of our empirical analysis, it is worth noticing that the same operator could have differ-
ent realizations of its innate cost on two different markets. This assumption captures the fact that costs
on a given network are to a large extent idiosyncratic.
11
2.1 Full Commitment
Suppose that the local government offers a long-term contract which covers two con-
tracting periods. The principal can commit to any pattern of subsidies and cost reim-
bursement rules over time and can reach thereby the highest possible intertemporal
payoff. This benchmark is attractive to later on evaluate the costs of renegotiation.
Let δ be the discount factor and let us normalize the length of the first-period ac-
counting period so that first-period welfare and profits receive the weight β = 1
1+δ
when computing net present values of those quantities.
Consider first a two-period fixed-price contract which entails the corresponding
subsidies is ti(c) = bi in each period i. With such fixed-price contracts, the principal
passes onto the operator all incentives to save on costs. Let e∗ be the corresponding
first-best effort such that ψ′(e∗) = 1, and denote by k = e∗ − ψ(e∗) its social value. This
long-term contract yields to the firm the (normalized) intertemporal payoff
βb1 + (1− β)b2 − θ + k.
Instead, with a cost-plus contract covering both periods, the operator is always
reimbursed for his costs so that he exerts no effort and his payoff is zero.20
Only the most efficient operators such that θ ≤ θ∗ choose fixed-price contracts.21 By
incentive compatibility, if any given type prefers a fixed-price contract, more efficient
types also do so. The types interval is thus split into two subsets. Efficient operators
take the fixed-price contract whereas inefficient ones go for the cost-plus. The marginal
operator with type θ∗ is just indifferent between those two options:
θ∗ = βb1 + (1− β)b2 + k.
Only efficient operators such that θ ≤ θ∗ who operate under a fixed-price contract earn
an information rent worth θ∗ − θ. 22
20The operator focuses on cost-reducing effort only and is not responsible for improving the quality
of the service. Quality entails various dimensions such as the size of the network, the number and size
of lines, the number of stops, the frequency of the service, and the age of the rolling stock which are
indeed observable and regulated by contract.
21From an empirical point of view, the econometrician only observes the choices made by operators,
i.e., a single item (either long-term fixed-price or cost-plus) and not the specific negotiation process
that leads to this choice. Following the mechanism design tradition, this process is captured because
principals offer menus among which operators with different types self-select.
22The operator’s choice between taking either a two-period fixed price contract or a cost-plus one
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The optimal subsidies under full commitment are given in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 Under full commitment, the optimal fixed-price contract is the twice-repeated
version of the static optimal one. The subsidy bF is constant over time: bF1 = bF2 = bF with
k =
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
R(bF + k). (1)
The most efficient firms (θ ≤ θF = bF + k) choose this two-period fixed-price contract. The
least efficient firms ( θ ≥ θF = bF + k) operate under a cost-plus contract for both periods.
The optimal menu of contracts trades off efficiency and rent extraction. Offering
a fixed price with a sufficiently large subsidy would ensure that the operator exerts
the first-best effort whatever his innate technology. However, doing so also leaves too
much information rent to the most efficient types and this is socially costly. A cost-plus
contract nullifies this rent but also destroys incentives to reduce costs.
Under full commitment, the optimal contract is the twice-repeated version of the
optimal static contract: a by-now standard result in the literature.23 Given that the eco-
nomic environment is stationary, the trade-off between rent extraction and efficiency
remains the same in both periods. Hence, there is no reason to move from a cost-plus
to a fixed-price contract over time.24 Such evidence thus suggests that the full commit-
ment scenario is not followed.
The optimal subsidy bF increases with k and α. Intuitively, when effort has a greater
social value or when the operator’s rent has more weight in the public authority’s
objectives, the optimal subsidy under a fixed-price contract must be raised to induce
more firms to operate under higher powered incentives which command more rent.
2.2 Renegotiation
Overview and modeling choices. The full commitment assumption does not capture
real-world practices as we explained above. Although the 1993 Law invites local au-
reveals information on his type. After this choice becomes publicly known, the public authority can
assess whether that type is above the threshold θ∗ or not. Under full commitment, the public authority
does not use such information to refine contractual offers in the future since no such offer is ever made.
23See Baron and Besanko (1984b) and Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 8).
24This justifies our initial focus on the binary choice between a long-term fixed-price and a long-term
cost-plus contract and explains why we did not consider more complex patterns with cost-plus contracts
followed by fixed-prices for instance. Such profiles are suboptimal under full commitment although
they will be attractive under limited commitment.
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thorities to re-auction concession contracts for a fixed period of 5 years, these authori-
ties are either reluctant to really implement the law or do not have enough expertise to
launch complex calls for tenders. In practice, local authorities consider the requirement
of re-auctioning the contract at fixed dates as the opportunity to renegotiate a contract
with the incumbent (the so-called ‘opérateur historique’) instead of really contemplating
the possibility to contract with a new operator.
Contract theory has distinguished between two kinds of paradigms when it comes
to model intertemporal contracting under limited commitment. The first concept al-
lows for long-term contracts which can be renegotiated if parties find it attractive.25
The second paradigm considers instead that only short-term contracts can be enforced.26
Although contracts in the French transportation sector have a limited duration, the sec-
ond of these paradigms does not capture the kind of relational contracting that char-
acterizes a long-lived relationship between a local authority and its ‘opérateur his-
torique’. The first paradigm better fits evidence, although it must be adapted to take
into account that, even though a long-term contract cannot be signed, the promise of
future recontracting is sufficiently credible. The renegotiation paradigm can then be
replaced by a ‘re-negotiation’ view of contracting that, although technically similar,
captures somewhat different real-world practices.
As soon as the local authority suffers from imperfect information on the operator’s
type, the selection of a contract within the simple two-item menu at the early con-
tracting stage reveals information on the firm’s type. Choosing a fixed-price contract
is interpreted by the principal as being ‘good news’ since it signals that the firm’s in-
nate efficiency parameter θ is low enough. Instead, choosing a cost-plus contract is
‘bad news.’ In a dynamic environment, information on costs is revealed over time
and the principal would like to draft new agreements that incorporate such informa-
tion. Renegotiating towards a second-period fixed-price contract with a large subsidy
allows operators who have revealed not to be very efficient earlier on by choosing a
cost-plus contract in the first period to reap productivity gains later on. Such large
subsidies might thus be viewed as ex post attractive from the principal’s viewpoint.
However, the second-period fixed-price contract may entail such a large subsidy that
25Dewatripont (1989), Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 10), Hart and Tirole (1988), Rey and Salanié
(1996).
26Guesnerie, Freixas and Tirole (1985), Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 9).
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even the most efficient operators may want to forego the gains of being under a fixed-
price contract earlier on and wait for such attractive opportunities at the renegotiation
stage. This important dynamic trade-off is at the core of our model.
Contracts. To build a model that fits with the contracting patterns which are actu-
ally found in our data set, we allow the principal to offer three possible options: A
two-period fixed-price contract, a first-period cost-plus contract followed by a second-
period fixed-price and a two-period cost-plus contract. Let us index by j = G, I,B,
respectively these three scenarios. Let also denote by C01 = (b1, b02) the subsidies under
scenario G, by C02 = (θ, b03) the payments under scenario I (where we take into account
that effort is zero at date 1 so that realized costs and payments are then equal to θ),
and finally C03 = (θ, θ) the payments under scenario B. We will use the more compact
notation C0 = (b1, b02, b03) to denote the overall menu of fixed prices and by R0 = (b02, b03)
its continuation for date 2.
Operators choose different options depending on their types. We look for a cut-off
equilibrium where the most efficient types that belong to a lower tail interval ΘG follow
history G, whereas intermediate and least efficient ones that belong respectively to the
middle interval ΘI and to the upper tail interval ΘB follow histories I and B.
Let denote R˜ = (C˜2, C˜3) ≡ (b˜2, b˜3) a subsidy profile offered at the renegotiation
stage following an initial offer C0.27 Renegotiation takes place if those new subsidies
increase the operator’s payoff, i.e., if the following inequalities hold:
b˜2 ≥ b02 and b˜3 ≥ b03. (2)
The first inequality in (2) says that types in ΘG accept the renegotiation that takes place
after the choice of an earlier fixed-price contract if it increases the subsidy above b02.
The second inequality is similar for types in ΘI who chose earlier on to operate with a
cost-plus contract.
Equilibrium concept. An almost perfect Bayesian equilibrium (in short equilibrium) of
the contractual game consists of the following strategies and beliefs:
• Principal’s strategy. The principal offers the menu C0 at date 1, but might propose
a renegotiation R˜ at date 2. This second-period offer (either b˜2 or b˜3) is made once the
principal has already updated his beliefs over the operator’s type following his earlier
27We omit the dependence of R˜ on C0 for notational simplicity.
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choice to operate under a fixed-price or a cost-plus in the first-period.
• Firm’s strategy. The firm anticipates (perfectly in equilibrium) the second period sub-
sidies following renegotiation. Let denote those anticipated subsidies by R = (b2, b3).
The firm follows a cut-off strategy that yields the following contracting pattern.
1. Types in ΘG =
[
θ, b1 + k +
1−β
β
(b2 − b3)
]
already adopt contract C01 anticipating
that b02 and b03 will be respectively renegotiated to b2 and b3. The cut-off type
θ∗1 = b1 + k+
1−β
β
(b2− b3) is just indifferent between choosing a two-period fixed-
price contracts with subsidies (b1, b2) and moving from a first-period cost-plus
contract to a second-period fixed-price contract with subsidy b3.
2. Types in ΘI = [b1 + k + 1−ββ (b2 − b3), b3 + k] choose contract C02 with the same
expectations than above. The cut-off type θ∗2 = b3 + k is just indifferent between
moving from a cost-plus to a fixed-price contract with subsidy b3 and operating
under a cost-plus contract over both periods.
3. Types in ΘB = [b3 + k, θ¯] choose a two-period cost-plus contract C03 anticipating
that the renegotiated fixed prices won’t be attractive for them anyway.
This pattern summarizes incentive compatibility in this dynamic context. To illustrate,
if the cut-off type θ∗1 is just indifferent between adopting fixed prices in both periods
or only at date 2, more efficient types, such that θ ≤ θ∗1, certainly also prefer to operate
under fixed-price contracts.
‘Almost’ equilibrium and limited updating. Before renegotiation, the principal up-
dates his beliefs using only the information that is revealed by the firm’s first-period
choice between operating under a fixed-price or a cost-plus contract. This is a slight de-
parture away from full rationality to the extent that the principal could have updated
his beliefs with the more precise information contained in the realized first-period costs
if the firm had operated under a cost-plus contract. This justifies the use of the qualifier
‘almost’ for our notion of equilibrium.28
28Relying on such ‘almost’ rational principal is of course a methodological simplification. With this
simplified view of updating, our model keeps then all the flavor of the dynamic rent/efficiency trade-off
familiar from the theoretical literature on renegotiation without making the analysis non-tractable even
though we consider here a model with a continuum of types.
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Renegotiation-Proofness Principle. The theoretical literature has shown that focusing
on renegotiation-proof mechanisms which come unchanged through the renegotiation
process is without loss of generality.29 Any long-term agreement which is renegotiated
to some contract could be replaced by another long-term contract with a second-period
continuation equal to this renegotiated offer. This continuation cannot be superseded
by any other contract; otherwise, it would not have been optimal to renegotiate to-
wards such offer in the first place. Our focus on renegotiation-proof profiles of subsi-
dies follows this logic.30
Renegotiation-proof profiles. Let us now characterize renegotiation-proof allocations.
Proposition 2 A first-period menu of contracts C = (b1, b2, b3) is renegotiation-proof if and
only if the following two conditions hold:
b3 ≥ βb1 + (1− β)b2, (3)
kf(b3 + k)−
(
1− α
1 + λ
)(
F (b3 + k)− F
(
b1 + k +
1− β
β
(b2 − b3)
))
≤ 0. (4)
Condition (3) ensures that the interval ΘI is non-empty. It is just a feasibility con-
dition on the possible subsidies profiles that are relevant to generate the pattern of
histories found in our data set. Condition (4) expresses the fact that raising the second-
period subsidy for those firms with intermediate types having taken contract C02 is not
found attractive by the principal at the renegotiation stage. For a renegotiation-proof
profile of subsidies, the efficiency gains obtained by slightly increasing the subsidy b3 to
attract less efficient operators who initially thought about operating under C03 should
be less than the net cost of raising the rent of all inframarginal types who already chose
C02 and enjoy that increase in the subsidy. Indeed, when b3 is increased by a small
amount db, the marginal type θ∗2, who is just indifferent between taking the two-period
29Hart and Tirole (1988), Dewatripont (1989), Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 10), Bester and Strausz
(2001).
30The theoretical literature on renegotiation focuses on discrete types distributions. Working with
a continuum is necessary to take into account the significant heterogeneity in costs realizations that
is found in our data set. It also allows us to divide the types space into three intervals ΘG, ΘI and
ΘB whose respective measures (obtained from the equilibrium behavior of cut-off types that define
those intervals) can be matched with the empirical distribution of observed behaviors. Models with
discrete types might allow a more detailed analysis of the pattern of information revelation and are thus
attractive from a theoretical point of view. However, such models would not explain well our data set.
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cost-plus contract and a fixed-price contract for the second period only, slightly moves
up and an extra mass of less efficient types f(b3 + k)db brings efficiency gains of size
k. On the other hand, information rents increase for all types in ΘI and that cost is
proportional to (F (b3 + k)− F (θ∗1)) db.
Optimal renegotiation-proof menus of contracts. Optimizing the principal’s expected
intertemporal welfare subject to the renegotiation-proofness constraint (4), we find:
Proposition 3 The optimal renegotiation-proof menu of contracts CR = (bR1 , bR2 , bR3 ) is such
that the two-period fixed-price contract entails a constant subsidy, bR1 = bR2 = b
R, which is
lower than the subsidy bR3 = b¯R when a fixed-price contract is chosen for the second period
only:
b¯R > bR. (5)
The renegotiation-proofness constraint (4) is binding:
kf(b¯R + k) =
(
1− α
1 + λ
)(
F (b¯R + k)− F
(
bR + k +
1− β
β
(bR − b¯R)
))
. (6)
To understand the intuition behind (5), notice that the renegotiation-proofness con-
straint (4) is relaxed when the probability of having a type in ΘI (i.e. the difference
F (b3 + k)− F
(
b1 + k +
1−β
β
(b2 − b3)
)
) increases. Intuitively, if there are enough types
in that middle interval, it becomes relatively costly to raise the subsidy b˜3 at the rene-
gotiation stage. Efficiency gains associated to such increase are then lower than the
increase in the information rents distributed to all types in such interval ΘI . Increasing
the probability F (b3 + k) − F
(
b1 + k +
1−β
β
(b2 − b3)
)
is obtained by committing to a
large b3 and low b1 and b2 that are not renegotiated. Finally, because the cut-off type θ∗1
depends only on the discounted subsidy b1 + 1−ββ b2, b1 and b2 must be reduced by the
same amount. Hence, with a two-period fixed-price contract, subsidies are constant
over time.
Our model predicts thus an increasing profile of subsidies in the following sense:
Types who choose only a fixed-price contract for the second period receive greater
subsidies than those who choose fixed-price arrangements earlier on.
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3 Empirical Model
We now turn to the empirical part of our analysis. Our objective is to assess the wel-
fare gains that could be obtained if parties to the contract could instead commit to
long-term contracts. To do so, we need to simulate an hypothetical situation of perfect
commitment, conditional on the current ingredients of the regulation of the French
public transportation industry under limited commitment. These ingredients are un-
known to the econometrician and need to be estimated. We explain in this section how
we recover these ingredients and present the estimated values.
The estimation strategy is organized as a three-step procedure. We first focus on
the menus of contracts faced by the operators. As we only observe the subsidies paid
to the firms, we miss at least one item of the menu (bR, b
R
or both, depending on
which contractual arrangement is observed). The missing items need therefore to be
recovered. In a second step, we estimate the ingredients of the model which are specific
to the operator. Given the menu of contracts, the operator chooses the contract that
maximizes his payoff. We use information on the contract choice, on the observed and
estimated subsidies, as well as several characteristics of the operator obtained from our
database to identify the distribution of the efficiency parameter θ and the social value
of effort k. Finally, we recover the missing elements that characterize the regulator’s
objective function. We focus at this stage on the optimality conditions induced by
Proposition 3.
Before turning to the empirical model itself, we present in the next section our data
and the different variables of interest. We explain as well throughout each step of the
empirical analysis how we organize our dataset for the estimation. In particular, we
define precisely which period and which network are selected in each case.
3.1 Data
Table 1 presents statistics on the different variables available in our data set. To un-
derstand how contracts are designed by public authorities and how operators choose
those contracts, we gather observations on subsidies. Such an information is required
to recover the distribution of the efficiency parameter. Subsidies entail all payments
to the operator, either at the beginning of the production process which are needed to
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reimburse expected costs (in the case of fixed-price regimes), as well as payments to
the operator at the end of the contracting period to guarantee full reimbursement of
total operating costs (in the case of cost-plus contracts).
Recall that our theoretical model makes the accounting simplification that commer-
cial revenues are kept by the public authority and that costs are reimbursed to the
operator. In our data, however, observed subsidies are the differences between ex-
pected or final costs and commercial revenues. To make our data coincide with the
model, we add commercial revenues to the observed subsidy. Finally, we distinguish
between nominal and real terms. Subsidies are deflated using consumer price indexes
(all items) for France. Only real subsidies are used during the estimation process.
The characteristics of the operators include the size of the network (measured in
kilometers), the number of lines operated, the size of the rolling stock (measured by
the number of vehicles), the share of the labor bill in total costs, the share of drivers or
engineers in the total labor force, and the identity of the industrial group which owns
the operator (Keolis, Transdev, Agir, or Connex). We thus assume that some firms
are more likely to perform efficiently than others due to intrinsic advantages of larger
stakes, size, managerial practices and concentration of skills.
Institutional variables describing the public authority comprise the number of cities
involved in organizing the service, population size for the total urban area where the
service is provided, and the political preference of the local regulator. As explained be-
fore, the urban network may include several municipalities. We observe the number of
cities in each urban area as well as the total population of these areas. We also construct
a dummy variable that takes value one if the local government is right-wing, and zero
when it is left-wing. Data on the political preference of the local government are pub-
lished by the French national newspaper Le Figaro. Over the period of investigation,
local governments may belong to one of the main political groups, ranked according
to their position on the political line from extreme right to extreme left (Extreme Right,
Right, Center Right, Left, and Extreme Left). We restrict the political landscape to two
groups, i.e., left-wing, and right-wing.
Our raw dataset includes 49 networks observed over the 1987-2001 period. As each
contractual period lasts for 5 to 6 years, although there are some exceptions and some
missing data, we observe series of 3 contracts per network in most cases. Hence, our
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initial database contains 136 contracts in total.31, 32
3.2 Step 1. Menus of contracts: Recovering Missing subsidies
A scenario with limited commitment corresponds to different observations with series
of fixed-price contracts, cost-plus contracts, or cost-plus contracts followed by fixed-
price contracts. The efficiency parameter θ of each operator, and therefore the subsidies
bR and b
R
of the proposed menu affect its choice of contract. A renegotiation-proof
scenario corresponds to the following possibilities.
• A series FF of fixed-price contracts over several contracting periods. The operator is
rather efficient (θ ≤ θ∗1 = bR + k + 1−ββ (bR − b
R
)).
• A cost-plus contract followed by a fixed-price contract (CF herein). The operator is
only mildly efficient (θ∗1 ≤ θ ≤ θ∗2 = b
R
+ k).
• A series of cost-plus contracts (CC herein). The operator is rather inefficient (θ ≥ θ∗2).
To exploit the two cut-offs θ∗1 and θ∗2 and recover the distribution of θ, we need to
observe the subsidies (bR and b
R
) specified in the optimal menu of contracts. Unfortu-
nately, our data do not allow us to observe all subsidies included into a renegotiation-
proof menu. Instead, only the actual subsidies paid to the operators are available.
31To make our dataset consistent with our (two-period) theoretical model, we structure our sample in
the following way: If a series of fixed-price regimes or a series of cost-plus regimes is considered, we
keep all the contractual periods under scrutiny for our empirical analysis, given that the subsidies are
constant from one period to another; hence, we may use series of three or more contracts in this case.
Now, when considering series where a fixed-price regime is implemented after a cost-plus, we restrict
our attention to contractual arrangements which start after the arrival of a new local government. In
this case, a cost-plus is followed by one fixed-price or a series of fixed-price contracts. As a result, the
sample which is considered for the estimation entails 117 contracts.
32Note that one contract in one network should in principle correspond to a unique observation in
our empirical model, i.e., the contract items should remain constant over the - say - 5 years of a contract
length. The data reality may be slightly different. In practice, the data set shows that over a single
contract period, many items may be affected by small fluctuations. This may for instance be the case of
the operator’s supply measured by the number of seat-kilometers available, which, in turns, makes the
costs and subsidy levels fluctuate too. These fluctuations follow from exogenous shocks that may affect
the activity of the operator over the contract length and are assumed to be i.i.d. in our model: changes in
traffic conditions, changes in network configuration, road constructions which may cut a service route
over a certain period, and strikes are all such examples. The economic responses to these predictable
shocks are written in the contract. Hence, although some items may fluctuate over the contract period,
they pertain to the same contract. Instead of calculating a simple average value of each item over the
contractual period when fluctuations are present, we choose to treat each contract-year as a separate
observation so that the number of degrees of freedom of our study is increased. This is why the number
of observations (579) is much larger in practice than the number of contracts.
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Hence, if the contractual arrangement is respectively
• FF , we observe bFF directly in the data and we need to recover bFF ,
• CF , we observe bCF directly in the data and we need to recover bCF ,
• CC, we need to recover bCC .
Estimation. We propose to recover the missing variables b
FF
, bCF , and b
CC
empirically.
In municipality i, we expect subsidies to depend on a set Y of characteristics of the
public authority, the operator, and the transportation service itself. We write:
bRi = B (Yi, τ) + i, (7)
bi
R
= B (Yi, υ) + κi, (8)
where i and κi are two error terms. The engineering relationships between the set of
variables Yi and each level of subsidy bi are identified through two distinct vectors of
parameters τ and υ, which have to be estimated. We thus expect to identify two distinct
marginal impacts of a given characteristic on the choice of bR and b
R
. According to
our theoretical model, we need to check that bRi < bi
R
. We verify ex post, i.e., on our
estimates, that these inequalities hold.
The estimation procedure works as follows. (i) If we select in our dataset FF ar-
rangements only, the observed subsidies are the bRi . Using observations Y FFi related to
these specific arrangements, we obtain maximum likelihood estimates of τ . We then
derive the value b̂
CF
i using our estimates τ and a set of characteristics Y CFi if a CF
arrangement is instead considered. (ii) Likewise, if we select in our dataset the fixed-
price contracts of the CF arrangements only, the observed subsidies are the bi
R
. Using
observations Y CFi for these specific arrangements, we obtain maximum likelihood es-
timates of κ. We then derive the value b̂
FF
i (resp. b̂
CC
i ) using our estimates κ and a set
of characteristics Y FFi (resp. Y CCi ) if a FF (resp. CC) arrangement is considered.33
Data selection. From the reduced sample, selecting FF arrangements only yields a
subsample of 54 fixed-price contracts, i.e., 300 contract-years. Likewise, when keeping
the fixed-price contracts of the CF arrangements only, we obtain a subsample of 23
fixed-price contracts, i.e., 93 contract-years.
33For ease of exposition, we omit the labels FF , CF , or CC in what follows.
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Results. We assume a linear relationship between a subsidy level and a set of char-
acteristics Yi in equations (7) and (8). The characteristics we focus on are related to
the regulator, the operator, or the network. These are the size of the rolling stock, the
size of the transport network, the share of the labor bill in total costs, a dummy vari-
able which takes value one if the local government is right-wing, and zero otherwise,
a dummy variable that takes value one if the operator belongs to the corporation Keo-
lis and zero otherwise, a dummy variable that takes value one if the operator belongs
to the corporation Agir and zero otherwise, and a dummy variable that takes value
one if the operator belongs to the corporation Connex and zero otherwise. We also
introduce operators’ fixed effects given that several contract-years are observed for the
same operator.
Results are presented in Table 2. Unsurprisingly, each subsidy level increases with
the volume of the rolling stock, or the network size. However, the network size is a
more important factor to explain the first-period subsidy bR, compared to b
R
, while
the second-period subsidy b
R
seems to be more sensitive to fluctuations in the rolling
stock. Subsidies decrease if the share of labor in total operating expenses increases.
Likewise, the right-wing variable has a negative and significant sign;34 note that the
right/left margin is more pronounced when it comes to explaining b
R
compared to bR.
Moreover, our results suggest that the group that owns the operator matters as well.
Operators owned by Agir tend to receive lower subsidies compared to operators of
other groups. Likewise, operators owned by Keolis receive higher bR and lower b
R
.
In Table 3, we present the average value and the standard deviation of the estimated
b̂
R
and b̂
R
for all contract-year of the reduced sample. A simple t-test confirms that both
quantities are statistically different from each other. Moreover, b̂
R
< b̂
R
as expected.
3.3 Step 2. Contract choice
We recover now the distribution of types by matching the theoretical probabilities of
the three observed contractual regimes FF , CF and CC being chosen with their em-
pirical probabilities. To do so, we take a parametric approach and assume that the
34This outcome is ambiguous since it is difficult to disentangle the right-wing effect from other factors
which are proper to right-wing governments; in particular, right-wing municipalities have a significant
preference for fixed-price contracts and this may explain why subsidies are lower in this case.
23
distribution F (·, νlc, σlc) is normal with mean νlc, variance σlc and density f (·, νlc, σlc).35
Data selection. To compute the distribution of θ, we use all contracts of our reduced
dataset since we look for the probabilities of choosing one series of contracts among all
possible arrangements. We thus consider 117 contracts, i.e., 579 contract-years.
Estimation. We assume that the θis are independent draws from a normal distribution
that is common across networks.36 The operator accepts a fixed-price contract in both
periods when θi ≤ θ∗1i = bRi + k + 1−ββ (bRi − b̂
R
i ) so that the probability of accepting such
fixed-price contract is:
Pr (θi ≤ θ∗1i) = F
(
bRi + ki +
1− β
β
(bRi − b̂
R
i ), νlc, σlc
)
. (9)
We consider here the pair
(
bRi , b̂
R
i
)
since the observed arrangement is FF . We allow
the unobserved social value of effort k to vary across networks; it depends on a set of
explanatory variables Xi which account for the characteristics of the operator:
ki = k (Xi, ϕ) , (10)
where ϕ is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
The operator goes from a cost-plus to a fixed-price contract when θ∗1i ≤ θi ≤ θ∗2i =
b
R
i + ki. The probability of such pattern is thus:
Pr (θ∗1i ≤ θi ≤ θ∗2i) = F
(
b
R
i + ki, νlc, σlc
)
− F
(
b̂
R
i + ki +
1− β
β
(̂b
R
i − b
R
i ), νlc, σlc
)
. (11)
We consider here the pair of subsidies
(
b̂
R
i , b
R
i
)
given a CF history.
35Our theoretical model assumes finite support for the distribution of innate costs. This is mainly to
avoid negative cost parameters. In our empirical analysis, those events have very low probabilities and
we simplify the analysis by using normal distributions. Note that using a normal distribution ensures
that our estimated distribution has short flat tails, i.e., a very small share of the operators lies in the
tails of the probability distribution. Using distributions on bounded intervals, such as the Beta or the
truncated normal, may be problematic. A Beta-distribution would impose a strong normalization on
costs, which is potentially damageable for the relevance of our structural model. At the same time,
identifying the additional parameters of a truncated normal is not feasible with our data.
36Attempts to identify fixed effect in our structural model through fixed-effect dummy variables have
been unfruitful. Note however that our structural model heavily relies on k, the social value of effort,
which itself depends on a set of explanatory variables, the operator’s group identity, the size of the
network, and the share of engineers in the labor force. The group identity variable is the group fixed
effect while the two latter variables are quite stable over time and can therefore be reasonably expected
to capture firms fixed effects.
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Finally, the operator takes cost-plus contracts in both periods when θ∗2i = b̂
R
i + ki ≤
θi. The probability of accepting such arrangement is thus:
Pr (θ∗2i ≤ θi) = 1− F
(
b̂
R
i + ki, νlc, σlc
)
. (12)
The log-likelihood of observing one specific contractual arrangement in network i over
period t can be written as:
Li (νlc, σlc) = ∆ilog
(
F
(
bRi + ki +
1− β
β
(bRi − b̂
R
i ), νlc, σlc
))
+
Πilog
(
F
(
b
R
i + ki, νlc, σlc
)
− F
(
b̂Ri + ki +
1− β
β
(b̂Ri − b
R
i ), νlc, σlc
))
+Σilog
(
1− F
(
b̂
R
i + ki, νlc, σrp
))
,
where {∆i,Πi,Σi} are three dummies taking value one if the observed contractual ar-
rangement is of type {FF,CF,CC} respectively, and zero otherwise.
Observations being independent, the log-likelihood for our sample is just the sum
of all individual log-likelihood functions:
L (µlc, σlc) =
N∑
i=1
Li (νrp, σlc) .
Results. To estimate F (·), we need to determine which variables X affect the social
value of effort k. Explanatory variables are related to the operator’s characteristics
(its skills and managerial ability, its effort technology). These variables are a constant,
the total size of the service network in kilometers, the number of lines operated, the
size of the rolling stock in number of vehicles, the share of the labor bill in total costs,
the percentage of engineers in the total labor force, a dummy variable worth one if
the operator belongs to the corporation Keolis and zero otherwise, a dummy variable
worth one if the operator belongs to the corporation Agir and zero otherwise, and a
dummy variable worth one if the operator belongs to the corporation Connex and zero
otherwise.
Results are presented in Table 4. During the estimation, we realized that explana-
tions for the social value of effort highly differ from one network to the other, i.e., we
could not obtain unique significant effects for all operators. Hence, we allow estima-
tion results to vary from one group to another. We present three different estimations.
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In column (I), k depends on four dummy variables which account for the identity
of the operator’s group (Connex is the reference group). Only Trandev has a signifi-
cant and positive effect on k, suggesting that an operator belonging to Transdev may
guarantee a higher social return on effort compared to operators from other groups.37
This result also suggests that Transdev has preferences for fixed-price contracts as an
increase in k increases the probability to choose a fixed-price regime. This pattern is
well known by transport regulators in France.38
In column (II), the explanatory variables are a constant for each group and the size
of the network interacted with each one of the group dummy variables. The results
show that the size of the network significantly and positively affects the social value of
effort in networks where Agir operates. This may illustrate that economies of scale in
effort technology are greater for larger networks.
In column (III), the explanatory variables are a constant for each group and the
share of engineers interacted with each one of the group dummy variables. The share
of engineers provides a measure for the endowment of skills embodied in the firm. En-
gineers are generally responsible for research and development, quality control, main-
tenance, and efficiency. Their action is particularly important to improve the average
speed of the network. We expect thus the share of engineers in the total labor force to
positively affect the social value of effort. Instead, the results suggest ambiguous ef-
fects. If the operator belongs to Transdev, the share of engineers has the expected effect.
If the operator belongs to Agir or Keolis, the effect goes in the opposite direction.
Other variables such as the number of lines operated, the size of the rolling stock, or
the share of the labor bill in total costs have not given significant results. The three es-
timation procedures yield very similar estimates of νlc and σlc, the mean and standard
deviation of θ’s normal distribution respectively. Our results are strongly significant
and suggest that the average innate cost θ varies between 14 and 15 millions Euros.
We also obtain a direct estimate of the intertemporal weight β. Values are between
0.25 and 0.41, indicating that the second period is perceived as more important.
37The social value of effort is negatively related to the technological cost of effort, which implies that
Transdev also enjoys a less costly effort technology. It would be interesting to relate these findings to the
internal structure of managerial incentives in that firm but we did not have access to such information.
38See the reports of the Groupement des Autorités Responsables de Transport (GART),
http://www.gart.org/S-informer/Publications-du-GART).
26
Finally, it is of interest to test whether our structural model for contract selection is
useful and appropriate. To do so, we test our model against a simple ordered probit
specification where the three contractual arrangements are chosen with probabilities
Pr (FF ) = Φ (−δX), Pr (CF ) = Φ (µ− δX)− Φ (−δX), and Pr (CC) = 1− Φ (µ− δX);
δ being a vector of parameters to be estimated together with µ, X being the set of
the operator’s characteristics described above, and Φ (.) being the c.d.f. of the normal
distribution. Since the two models are non-nested, we use a test proposed by Vuong
(1989). The null hypothesis is that both models are equally far from the true data
generating process in terms of Kullback-Liebler distances. The alternative hypothesis
is that one of the two models is closer to the true data generating process. When the
Vuong statistics is less than 2 in absolute value, the test does not favor one model
against the other. Here, the statistics of our structural model versus the ordered probit
is 4.7. This strongly supports the structural approach presented in this paper.
3.4 Step 3. Political preferences
Once estimates ν̂lc, σ̂lc, β̂ and k̂i are obtained, we evaluate the regulator’s preference
parameter α̂i. To do so, we use the renegotiation-proofness condition (6) rewritten
now as:
−ki f
(
b
R
i + ki, νlc, σlc
)
+
(
1− αi
1 + λ
)(
F
(
b
R
i + ki, νlc, σlc
)
− F
(
bRi + ki +
1− β
β
(
bRi − b
R
i
)
, νlc, σlc
))
= 0, i = 1, .., N.
(13)
The weight αi varies across cities. It depends on a set of explanatory variables Zi
which characterize the local authority:
αi = α (Zi, χ) , (14)
where χ is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
We cannot identify separately the weight α and the cost of public funds λ since only
the ratio α
1+λ
matters in Equation (6). We will thus let λ take several values which are
consistent with the cost of an administration operating in a developed country.39 We
39Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) provided estimates (namely, 1.17 to 1.56) of the welfare loss due
to a one-percent increase in all distortionary tax rates (see also Hausman and Poterba (1987) on this). In
the case of Canadian commodity taxes, Campbell (1975) found that this distortion is equal to 1.24. More
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only present estimation results when λ = 0.3. Alternative estimates of α can easily be
calculated when λ 6= 0.3.
Data selection. We restrict the reduced sample to fixed-price contracts only given that
Proposition 3 is about short-term (the fixed-price contracts belong to a CF arrange-
ment) and long-term (the fixed-price contracts belong to a FF arrangement) fixed-price
regimes. This yields a subsample of 77 contracts, i.e., 393 contract-years.
Estimation. To obtain maximum likelihood estimates, Equation (13) is rewritten as
J
(
bR, b
R
, ki, αi, λ, νrp, σlc, ξi
)
= 0, (15)
where ξi is an error term. We need again do distinguish between the observed and
the estimated
(
bR, b
R
)
. If the observed fixed-price contract is extracted from a CF
arrangement, we consider the pair
(
b̂
R
i , b
R
i
)
. Otherwise, If the observed fixed-price
contract belongs to a FF arrangement, we consider the pair
(
bRi , b̂
R
i
)
.
Results. The explanatory variables which enter Zi are a constant, the number of cities
within the local authority in charge of the service, the size of the population of the rel-
evant urban area, and the local political preference.40 With the first two variables, we
want to test whether the size of the city or a greater division of the network into dis-
tinct urban areas affects the bargaining power of the operator. We expect the latter to
be more important in small networks or networks made of many urban areas. With re-
spect to the political preference of the local government, casual evidence suggests that
a right-wing local government is more eager to favor private operators. The estimate
α̂i should thus be higher with a right-wing local government.41
Results are presented in Table 5. First, the number of cities constituting the local
authority and population size were not significant and have been discarded. Second,
whether the government is right-wing or not has a positive and very significant impact
on α, confirming thereby our prior intuition. In this case, α takes value 0 for left-wing
local governments while it is strictly positive for the right-wing ones. Third, our initial
restriction α ≤ 1 + λ holds, even though it is not imposed in the estimation.
generally, distortions fall between 1.15 and 1.40 in countries with an efficient tax system. Gagnepain and
Ivaldi (2002) obtained a similar result in their study of the French transportation sector.
40When the local authority includes several cities, the political preference is that of the main munici-
pality.
41This point is corroborated in Levin and Tadelis (2009).
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A potential criticism of our three-step estimation procedure is that we may not fully
account for the optimality conditions satisfied by bR and b¯R which are not part of the
estimation process.42 An alternative estimation procedure could consist in recovering
values of
(
bR, b
R
)
through the system made of those two optimality conditions plus
the renegotiation-proofness constraint. Thus, bR (·) and bR (·) would be two functions
of a set of variables and parameters to be estimated which we could use to write the
log-likelihood of observing one specific contractual arrangement in a similar fashion
as in Step 2. Although attractive, this alternative procedure suffers from a serious
drawback in that it does not use our data observations of
(
bR, b
R
)
. Using directly the
data observations of
(
bR, b
R
)
or recovering
(
bR, b
R
)
through a system of optimality
conditions would probably yield a similar outcome if our theoretical model perfectly
explained the data reality, which is probably excessive. We therefore prefer to use the
data information on
(
bR, b
R
)
. To convince the reader that our approach is reasonable,
we propose an ex post test to check that our estimates ν̂lc, σ̂lc, β̂, k̂i, and α̂i verify the
conditions expressed in (24) and (25). To do so, we replace µ in (24) by its expression
from (25) in order to generate an equation (24’). Then, we compute a t-test to check
whether the left-hand side of equation (24’) is significantly different from its right-hand
side. We cannot reject the hypothesis that both sides are equal.
4 The Welfare Gains of Commitment
We assess now the magnitude of the welfare gains which can be obtained once one
moves from the renegotiation-proof setting to the less constrained full commitment
scenario. We also investigate how these gains are distributed between private opera-
tors and taxpayers. This is an important issue for practitioners since they often have
complained about the insufficient length of concession contracts in this sector.
Starting from our estimates of the various parameters of the model obtained from
the renegotiation-proof scenario, we can reconstruct estimates of the average social
cost of subsidies and the average rent left to operators under full commitment.43 We
42See the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix for expressions of those conditions.
43Remember that our theoretical model has normalized the value of the service at some fixed level
S so that consumers’ gross surplus does not change when considering different regimes. This variable
will thus be omitted in our analysis.
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proceed as follows.44
Data selection. We restrict the reduced sample to FF arrangements only given that
proposition 1 is about long-term fixed-price contracts. Moreover, we focus on right-
wing networks only since we need α̂R > 0. Once outliers are discarded, we obtain a
subsample of 114 contract-years.
Step 1. Using our set of renegotiation-proof estimates ΥR =
(
ν̂R, σ̂R, k̂R, α̂R, β̂R
)
con-
ditional on λ and its expression from the maximand in a scenario with limited com-
mitment, we compute expected welfare levelsWRi for each network of our subsample.
As emphasized throughout this section, the renegotiation-proof scenario corresponds
to the actual contractual practices encountered in the French urban transport industry.
Hence, the estimates ΥR give to the econometrician some information on the operator’s
and public authority’s true characteristics.
Step 2. We simulate the hypothetical subsidy level b̂Fi that would be paid under full
commitment. To do so, we solve (1) with respect to b̂Fi , using the real networks charac-
teristics ΥR.
Step 3. We reconstruct the hypothetical welfare measures WˆFi for each network of our
subsample, as predicted under full commitment, and using estimates b̂Fi and ΥR.
We compute the total welfare gains as well as the gains for taxpayers and oper-
ators from commitment by considering an average network of the subsample, using
estimates ΥR conditional on λ = 0.3 and ki specified as in (II) in Table 4.45
The estimates reported in Table 6 shed light on several interesting results. Of course,
commitment always improves welfare compared to the situation where renegotiation
puts further constraints on contracting. The important question is actually to deter-
mine how welfare gains of commitment are distributed between the parties. It turns
out that T̂ Fi > T̂Ri , i.e., switching from limited to full commitment entails a higher in-
tertemporal subsidy. The intertemporal payment to the operator increases, on average,
by 6.1 million Euros. Hence, taxpayers lose from an increase in the length of concession
contracts, given that social costs increase by 8 million Euros (+22.4%) on average.
Turning now to operators, our estimates show that their intertemporal rent in-
44See the Appendix for details.
45Note that the final welfare results do not vary in a significant manner if other values of ki are chosen.
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creases when moving to full commitment by 8.2 million Euros (+11.5%). This is a
significant gain that explains why operators are pushing to increase contracts length.
5 Alternative Assumptions
Overall, the analysis above suggests that our structural model is a reasonable represen-
tation of the industry: We have provided a test which rejects a simple contract choice
model with no asymmetric information parameters against our structural approach.
The estimated parameters obtained from the empirical model are in general significant
and have signs which go in the right direction. Moreover, although we do not impose
any constraint on the estimation procedures, we do obtain estimates that are consistent
with the assumptions of the theoretical model.
For the sake of completeness, this section nevertheless discusses alternative scenar-
ios which could be relevant to explain our data, or which could be simulated using
ingredients from our limited commitment model. Our goal here is to point out a few
criticisms of those alternative explanations, to confirm the relevance of our focus on
renegotiation as the main explanation of the contracting patterns found in the data set,
and provide additional welfare measures for different contracting scenarios.
5.1 Evolving Bargaining Powers
The optimal subsidy given by (1) is greater when the operator’s bargaining power α
increases. This suggests that a pattern where greater subsidies are offered following
an earlier cost-plus contract could also be replicated with the simpler assumption that
bargaining power evolves over time. More precisely, suppose that only short-term
contracts can be signed but that innate costs are independent draws from the same
distribution in each period. Subsidies in each period are still given by (1) with the
added feature that α is time-varying and increasing.
There are two issues with such model. The first one is that it is difficult to under-
stand why changes in α would depend on the earlier history (fixed-price or cost-plus)
and especially be more pronounced following a cost-plus contract as featured in our
dataset. Indeed, economic theory suggests that changes in bargaining power could
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result from a more pronounced collusion between operators and public authorities, or
from more symmetric stands following earlier sunk investments by operator. How-
ever, both collusion and sunk investments are facilitated when rents are high; a feature
of fixed-price contracts. So if anything, the operator’s bargaining power should in-
crease following fixed-price and not cost-plus contracts.
Second, we can construct a simple test of whether subsidies increase over time and
whether this pattern is firm specific. If the bargaining power of an operator increased
over time and affected subsidies, we should observe an increase in the subsidy levels
of the successive fixed-price contracts signed after a cost-plus regime for this opera-
tor. We run a simple regression of the log subsidy paid on a set of covariates plus
a dummy which measures whether the observed fixed-price contract is implemented
after a cost-plus regime or not (CF ), an interaction Trend × CF , three interactions
Trend×CF×Firmj where Firmj is a dummy variable that accounts for the identity of
the company which owns the observed operator, and a set of firms fixed effects. None
of the interactions has a significant impact on the observed subsidies, which suggests
that an increase of the bargaining power over time is unlikely, or that, if the bargaining
power of firms increases over time, it does not affect subsidies.46
5.2 Short-Term Contracts
An alternative scenario, already investigated both in the theoretical and empirical lit-
eratures,47 is the only feasible contracts are short-term. In the present context of the
French transportation sector, we argued above that this scenario does not fit actual
practices. Nevertheless, and for completeness, it is worth simulating the welfare im-
pact of such stronger degree of contract incompleteness, much in spirit of Section 4.
This allows us to compare welfare between full commitment, limited commitment,
and no-commitment.
Let us briefly sketch how the contracting game unfolds with short-term contracts.
In the first period, operators again select different contracts according to their innate
46Estimation results are (392 observations, firms fixed effects included, standard errors in parenthesis):
log Subsidy = 4.94
(0.26)
+ 0.68
(0.05)
log Rolling Stock + 0.22
(0.03)
log network − 0.11
(0.03)
Right-Wing + 0.32
(0.13)
CF + 0.01
(0.01)
Trend×CF −0.01
(0.01)
Trend×CF ×Keolis+ 0.00
(0.01)
Trend×CF ×Connex+ 0.08
(0.07)
Trend×CF ×Transdev.
47See respectively Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 9) and Dionne and Doherty (1994).
32
costs. As before the most efficient firms choose a first-period fixed-price contract with
subsidy b1 whereas the least efficient ones operate under a cost-plus contract. Before
re-contracting, the principal updates his beliefs on the operator’s cost parameter ac-
cording to whether a fixed-price or a cost-plus contract has been chosen.48
To make comparison between the cases of short-term contracting and renegotiation
more meaningful, we focus on equilibria with short-term contracts which generate the
three patterns observed in our data: Fixed-price or cost-plus contracts over both peri-
ods, or a cost-plus followed by a fixed-price contract. Following our earlier notations,
a profile of subsidies (b1, b2, b3) is offered at the different points in time along the dif-
ferent histories. Of course, the principal chooses a first-period subsidy that determines
the first-period cut-off with an eye on how it affects the continuation of the contracting
game. In particular, following an earlier choice of a cost-plus contract and thus know-
ing that the operator’s type is greater than θ∗1, the optimal second-period subsidy b3
must be conditionally optimal given the principal’s updated beliefs:
kf(b3 + k) =
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
(F (b3 + k)− F (θ∗1)). (16)
This ‘conditional optimality’49 just expresses the fact that, in choosing the second-
period subsidy, the principal trades off the extra cost in terms of extra rents and the
efficiency gains of offering a greater subsidy b3 for a subset of types who operated ear-
lier on under a cost-plus. This condition is very similar to the binding renegotiation-
proofness constraint (4) up to a (possibly) different value for the first-period cut-off θ∗1.
The main difference between the no-commitment and the renegotiation-proof scenar-
ios comes instead following the earlier choice of a fixed-price contract. The principal
then knows that the firm is rather efficient and has thus incentives to cut down second-
period subsidies; a well-known instance of the ‘ratchet effect’. More formally, if type
θ∗1 is indifferent between a fixed-price and a cost-plus contract in the first period and
chooses a fixed-price, it will receive only a low subsidy b2 such that θ∗1 = b2 + k in the
second period while choosing a cost-plus in the first period would have secured more
rent later on through increased subsidies. This subsidy b2 extracts all second-period
rent from that cut-off type. The principal cannot make any credible promise to reward
operators who choose earlier on a fixed-price contract with some extra rent later on. As
48As in our main renegotiation scenario, we assume that, had a cost-plus been chosen, the exact real-
ization of those costs would not be used to update the principal’s beliefs.
49The term was coined by Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 10).
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a result, subsidies are decreasing over time in the sense of b2 < b1.50 This is in contrast
with what we observe in our data and what a renegotiation-proof scenario predicts. In
that case, the principal can smooth the rewards for choosing earlier to operate under a
two-period fixed-price contract with subsidies which are constant over time.
Turning to the empirical analysis, we simulate the welfare obtained with this short-
term contract scenario with our data. The empirical strategy is similar to the one pre-
sented in Section 4: Starting from our estimates of the various parameters of the model
obtained from the renegotiation-proof scenario, we can reconstruct estimates of the
cut-offs θ∗1, θ∗2, and θ∗3 that delineate the various first-period scenarios. The correspond-
ing subsidies and the value of welfare are then easily computed. The empirical results
suggest that moving to short-term contracts deteriorates welfare compared to limited
commitment. For the average network, the welfare obtained under limited commit-
ment represents 98% of the welfare obtained under full commitment while a scenario
with short-term contracting captures only 93% of this full commitment welfare.51
6 Conclusion
We have developed a principal-agent model under limited commitment that features
the main characteristics of contracts and institutional practices in the French urban
transportation sector. On top of estimating key parameters of the economic and polit-
ical landscape in this sector, this model has allowed us to evaluate the cost of renego-
tiation and how welfare gains would be redistributed by increasing contract duration
and improving commitment. The welfare gains from extending contract length are
significant but mostly accrue to operators.
Our analysis, however, calls for a few remarks and alleys for further investigation.
First, our result on the significant welfare gains of extending contract length should
be taken with some words of caution. Indeed, it starts from the premise that, in this
sector, competition is almost absent at the bidding stage. We are thus examining the
benefits of such reform in a monopolistic setting where more competition could even
bring higher welfare gains. However, extending contract length might not favor the
50See the Appendix for details.
51These simulations are computed with a smaller database than the one used in Section 4. For this
reason, the welfare differentials presented here slightly depart from those presented in Table 6.
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emergence of a more competitive playing field which may reduce long-run welfare.
By focusing on menus with only two items (fixed-price and cost-plus contracts)
whereas a model with a continuum of types might invite more complex menus and
by simplifying the procedure for updating beliefs, we have significantly simplified
our theoretical model. The benefit is that we were able to bring the lessons of the
renegotiation literature to the data. Taking data and institutional constraints seriously
forced us instead to focus on the case of simple menus which, although suboptimal,
brings also some tractability. This approach might also be fruitful in other contexts
where full-fledged theoretical models become non-tractable.
Even though our estimates are significant, we might be underestimating the welfare
gains of commitment. Indeed, we have no ideas on how renegotiation weakens the op-
erator’s incentives to make relationship-specific investments except through informal
talks with practitioners in the field. Introducing these considerations would reinforce
our argument in favor of extending contract length. Longer contract durations would
indeed secure specific investments and avoid hold-ups.
On the other hand, one could also argue that even writing a long-term contract
may entail significant transaction costs, especially when future contingencies cannot be
perfectly foreseen ex ante. In our model, such transaction costs have deliberately been
omitted since we focused on stationary environments where efficiency parameters are
drawn once for all. Introducing the possibility of writing more flexible contracts as
uncertainty gets resolved would unveil some interesting benefits of renegotiation. On
top, the need for drafting flexible arrangements may also favor fixed-price contracts
since those contracts make operators more reactive to shocks affecting their costs. Yet,
it is unclear to us whether those theoretical arguments in favor of some kind of limited
commitment matter in the transportation sector under scrutiny.
A more complete analysis of the renegotiation process should incorporate the pos-
sibility that public authorities build reputations for being tough at the renegotiation
stage to avoid thereby giving larger subsidies to operators. Reputation building might
significantly relax renegotiation-proofness constraints. In other words, an omitted
variable of our analysis is the amount of reputational capital available to the contract-
ing parties involved in those repeated negotiations. By putting reputation aside, we
have thus analyzed a ‘worst scenario´ under renegotiation. More research both on the
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theory side but also in building data sets which could account for that reputational
capital is certainly called for.
Our estimation has highlighted a few systematic differences between operators of
different companies in their abilities to generate social value through managerial ef-
forts. It would be worth linking those different abilities to the internal organizations,
the management practices and incentive structures of those firms. At this stage, we
have no information on this issue.
Other weaknesses of our analysis could be improved in the future: Our cost func-
tion is quite basic; while it offers convenience and tractability to develop the theo-
retical model, it may reasonably raise concerns on the predictability of the estimated
model. More flexible functional forms and/or non-parametric techniques could be in-
vestigated. Note also that our simulations of the full commitment or no-commitment
cases assume that the current ingredients of the industry are unchanged. This assump-
tion could be relaxed; we could for instance expect that the distribution of the innate
costs is different under a full commitment scenario if new operators with different cost
characteristics enter the market (knowing that regulatory rules are modified). We have
currently no theoretical justification to offer to describe such changes but further in-
vestigation in this direction is indeed welcome. We have also noted that the industry
has changed significantly after 2001. In particular, movements of operators from one
network to another have been observed. Modeling the strategic behavior of operators
in competitive tendering is an interesting topic that needs to be addressed as well.
Lastly, our estimate of the cost distribution allows us to ascertain whether the re-
striction to simple menus matters even in a static context. Echoing the theoretical
works of Rogerson (2003) and Chu and Sappington (2007), we could indeed ask whether
simple two-item menus fare well compared with more complex menus given our esti-
mate of the types distribution. Such investigation would help us to unveil whether the
major sources of benefits in contract design come either from extending contract length
or from better designing cost reimbursement rules in any given period. This last issue
is high on practitioners’ agenda.
We hope to investigate some of those issues in future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Intertemporal welfare under full commitment is:
W F (b1, b2) = S−(1+λ)
(
(βb1 + (1− β)b2)F (βb1 + (1− β)b2 + k) +
ˆ θ¯
βb1+(1−β)b2+k
θf(θ)dθ
)
+α
ˆ βb1+(1−β)b2+k
θ
(βb1 + (1− β)b2 + k − θ)f(θ)dθ.
The term (βb1 + (1 − β)b2)F (βb1 + (1 − β)b2 + k) represents the expected subsidy un-
der a long-term fixed-price contract knowing that only a mass of those types worth
F (βb1+(1−β)b2+k) takes such contract. The term
´ θ¯
βb1+(1−β)b2+k θf(θ)dθ is the expected
payment under a cost-plus contract. Finally, the last term represents the expected infor-
mation rent which is left only to the most efficient firms under the fixed-price contract.
The principal’s problem under full commitment can be rewritten as:
(PF ) : max
(b1,b2)
W F (b1, b2)
The monotone hazard rate property ensures quasi-concavity of this objective.52 The
corresponding first-order conditions characterize the optimal subsidy in (1) which is
constant over time.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first describe the timing of the game with the possibility
of renegotiation. Proposition 4 then shows the validity of the Renegotiation-Proofness
Principle in our context. We finally characterize renegotiation-proof profiles.
Timing.
• Date 0: The firm learns its efficiency parameter θ.
• Date 0.25: The principal commits to a menu (C01 , C02 , C03) ≡ C0 = (b1, b02, b03).
• Date 0.50: The firm makes its choice among those three possible options. The prin-
cipal updates his beliefs on the firm’s innate cost taking into account whether a fixed-
price or a cost-plus contract is chosen in the first period.
• Date 1.00: First-period costs and payments are realized.
•Date 1.25: If he wishes so, the principal offers a renegotiation with a new (fixed-price)
subsidy. Let these new subsidies be b˜2 and b˜3.
52See for instance Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).
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• Date 1.50: The firm chooses whether to accept the new offer or not and chooses the
second-period effort accordingly. If the offer is refused, the initial contract is enforced.
Otherwise, the renegotiated offer supersedes the initial contract.
• Date 2: Second-period costs and payments are realized.
Proposition 4 There is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to contracts of the form
C = (b1, R) that come unchanged through the renegotiation process, i.e., such thatR = (b2, b3)
maximizes the principal’s second period welfare subject to the following acceptance conditions:
b˜2 ≥ b2 and b˜3 ≥ b3. (17)
Proof: Fix any initial contract C0 and consider renegotiated offers R˜ = (b˜2, b˜3) that
satisfies (2). Given the agent’s conjectures about the renegotiated subsidies R = (b2, b3)
(which are correct at equilibrium), the principal’s expected welfare for date 2 becomes:
W2(C
0, R˜, R) =
ˆ b1+k+ 1−ββ (b2−b3)
θ
(
S − (1 + λ)b˜2 + α(b˜2 + k − θ)
)
f(θ)dθ (18)
+
ˆ b˜3+k
b1+k+
1−β
β
(b2−b3)
(
S − (1 + λ)b˜3 + α(b˜3 + k − θ)
)
f(θ)dθ (19)
+
ˆ θ¯
b˜3+k
(S − (1 + λ)θ) f(θ)dθ. (20)
Note that this expression is ‘unconditional’, i.e., it is a weighted sum of the welfares
following each possible first-period scenario with the weights being the corresponding
probabilities F
(
b1 + k +
1−β
β
(b2 − b3)
)
of choosing the two-period fixed-price contract
(i.e., C01 ) earlier on and 1 − F
(
b1 + k +
1−β
β
(b2 − b3)
)
of operating under a cost-plus
contract in the first period (i.e., either C02 or C03 ).
The ‘conditional’ second-period welfares following the first-period choice to oper-
ate under either a fixed-price (following C01 ) or a cost-plus (following either C02 or C03 )
contract are respectively
W2(C0, R˜, R|FP ) =
ˆ b1+k+ 1−ββ (b2−b3)
θ
(
S − (1 + λ)b˜2 + α(b˜2 + k − θ)
) f(θ)
F
(
b1 + k +
1−β
β
(b2 − b3)
)dθ
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and
W2(C0, R˜, R|CP ) =
ˆ b˜3+k
b1+k+
1−β
β
(b2−b3)
(
S − (1 + λ)b˜3 + α(b˜3 + k − θ)
) f(θ)
1− F
(
b1 + k +
1−β
β
(b2 − b3)
)dθ
+
ˆ θ¯
b˜3+k
(S − (1 + λ)θ) f(θ)
1− F
(
b1 + k +
1−β
β
(b2 − b3)
)dθ.
MaximizingW2(C0, R˜, R|FP ) with respect to b˜2 andW2(C0, R˜, R|CP ) with respect
to b˜3 is clearly equivalent to maximizing W2(C0, R˜, R) with respect to R˜ = (b˜2, b˜3).
Because it is more compact, this latter (‘unconditional’) approach is privileged here.
The expression ofW2(C0, R˜, R) takes into account that operators with types in ΘG =
[θ, b1 + k +
1−β
β
(b2 − b3)] are already committed to a two-period fixed-price contract an-
ticipating second-period equilibrium subsidies. These operators nevertheless welcome
any increase in the second-period subsidy b˜2 above b2 at the renegotiation stage. The
principal’s payoff from such deviation must be computed with this new subsidy. This
yields a contribution to expected second period welfare equal to the first-term in (18).
Types in ΘI = [b1 + k + 1−ββ (b2 − b3), b3 + k] are committed to operate under a fixed-
price contract only in the second period. But increasing this second-period subsidy
from b3 to b˜3 attracts some even less efficient operators who are now willing to operate
under a fixed-price contract. The least efficient types in [b˜3 + k, θ¯] remain on a cost-plus
contract. This yields the expressions of the last two terms (19) and (20).
The principal maximizes the second-period welfare W2(C0, R˜, R) subject to the ac-
ceptance condition (2). The renegotiated offers R = (b2, b3) must solve:
(R0) : R = arg max
R˜
W2(C
0, R˜, R) subject to (2).
Take any initial contract offer C0 = (b1, R0) and define R as the solution to (R0).
Consider now the new contract C = (b1, R). We want to prove that the history of the
firm’s types self-selection and the principal’s second-period payoff are both unchanged
with this new offer. Several observations lead to that result.
1. Since the agent’s perfectly anticipates the issue of renegotiation and makes his
first-period choices accordingly, self-selection among the three different options
takes place exactly in the same way with C as when C0 is initially offered.
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2. By definition, any offer R˜ = (b˜2, b˜3) that is feasible at the renegotiation-stage given
R is feasible given R0. Indeed, that b2 satisfies the first condition in (2) and b˜2
satisfies the first condition in (17) implies
b˜2 ≥ b02. (21)
Similarly, that b3 satisfies the second condition in (2) and b˜3 satisfies the second
condition in (17) implies
b˜3 ≥ b03. (22)
3. By definition, R solves (R0) and thus for any R˜ = (b˜2, b˜3) that is feasible given R0,
we have:
W2((b
0
1, R), R,R) ≥ W2((b01, R), R˜, R). (23)
This condition is true, in particular, for any R˜ = (b˜2, b˜3) that is feasible if R is
offered at the renegotiation-stage. This shows that R comes unchanged through
the renegotiation process, i.e., solves the following problem:
(R) : R = arg max
R˜
W2((b1, R), R˜, R) subject to (17).
This ends the proof of Proposition 4.
Turning now to problem (R), first note that α < 1 + λ implies that the maximum of
the integral in (18) is obtained when (17) is binding.
Second, consider (unexpected) renegotiation offers with b˜3 ≥ b3. Types in [b3 +
k, b˜3+k] which were expecting to operate on a second-period cost-plus contract are now
adopting the fixed-price contract with the new greater subsidy b˜3 at the renegotiation
stage. Optimizing (R) which is quasi-concave in b˜3 and taking into account that b3
must be the solution yields condition (4).
Proof of Proposition 3. Define now the principal’s intertemporal welfare when offer-
ing C = (b1, b2, b3) as:
W(C) =
ˆ b1+k+ 1−ββ (b2−b3)
θ
(S − (1 + λ)(βb1 + (1− β)b2) + α(βb1 + (1− β)b2 + k − θ)) f(θ)dθ
+
ˆ b3+k
b1+k+
1−β
β
(b2−b3)
(S − (1 + λ)(βθ + (1− β)b3) + α(1− β)(b3 + k − θ)) f(θ)dθ
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+ˆ θ¯
b3+k
(S − (1 + λ)θ) f(θ)dθ.
The optimal renegotiation-proof menu solves the following optimization problem:
(PR) : max
C
W(C) subject to (3) and (4).
We shall assume quasi-concavity in (b1, b2, b3) of the corresponding Lagrangean. The
solution CR = (bR1 , bR2 , bR3 ) to problem (PR) is then straightforward. The first-order
optimality conditions for bR1 and bR2 are the same so that, it is optimal to set bR1 = bR2 =
bR. Taking into account this fact and optimizing with respect to (bR, b¯R) yields the
following first-order conditions:
k =
(
1− α
1 + λ
)(
R
(
bR + k +
1− β
β
(bR − b¯R)
)
+
µ
β(1 + λ)
)
, (24)
k =
(
1− α
1 + λ
)F (b¯R + k)− F
(
bR + k + 1−β
β
(bR − b¯R)
)
f(b¯R + k)− f
(
bR + k + 1−β
β
(bR − b¯R)
)

−µ
((
1− α
1+λ
)(f(b¯R+k)
1−β +
f(bR+k+ 1−ββ (b
R−b¯R))
β
)
− kf ′(b¯R+k)
1−β
)
(1 + λ)
(
f(b¯R + k)− f
(
bR + k + 1−β
β
(bR − b¯R)
)) (25)
where µ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of (4).
Moreover, (4) implies that
F (b¯R + k)− F
(
bR + k +
(1− β)
β
(bR − b¯R)
)
≥ 0
which itself implies bR ≤ b¯R.
Welfare Estimates. Using our estimates from the case where renegotiation-proof con-
tracts are considered, we get the following expression of welfare in network i:
WRi = S − (1 + λ)TRi + α̂Ri URi , (26)
where
TRi =
ˆ bRi +k̂Ri + 1−β̂β̂ (bRi −bRi )
θ
bRi f(θ)dθ +
ˆ bRi +k̂Ri
bRi +k̂
R
i +
1−β̂
β̂
(bRi −b
R
i )
(β̂θ + (1− β̂)bRi )f(θ)dθ
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+ˆ θ¯
b
R
i +k̂
R
i
θf(θ)dθ,
and
URi =
ˆ bRi +k̂Ri + 1−β̂β̂ (bRi −bRi )
θ
(
bRi + k̂
R
i − θ
)
f(θ)dθ+
ˆ bRi +k̂Ri
bRi +k̂
R
i +
1−β̂
β̂
(bRi −b
R
i )
(1− β) (bRi +k̂Ri −θ)f(θ)dθ.
Likewise, from our full commitment program, we define welfare as the weighted
sum of surplus S, expected taxes T Fi and operator’s expected rent UFi weighted by the
corresponding weight α̂Ri :
WFi = S − (1 + λ)T Fi + α̂Ri UFi , (27)
where
T Fi = b̂
F
i F
(
b̂Fi + k̂
R
i
)
+
ˆ θ¯
b̂Fi +k̂
R
i
θf(θ)dθ,
and
UFi =
ˆ b̂Fi +k̂Ri
θ
(̂bFi + k̂
R
i − θ)f(θ)dθ.
Note that the gross surplus S vanishes when one computes the difference between
both welfare measures WRi and WFi . Hence, we evaluate the welfare differential be-
tween both renegotiation-proof and perfect commitment situations as
∆Wi =WFi −WRi . (28)
Similar definitions follow for ∆Ti and ∆Ui.
Short-Term Contracts. This Appendix characterizes an equilibrium sequence of short-
term contracts. We are again looking for a partition equilibrium where, in the first
period, types θ > θ∗1 choose a cost-plus contract whereas types θ ≤ θ∗1 choose a fixed-
price contract with subsidy b1. Continuation contracts depend on what happened in
the first period. Again following any first-period history and after having updated
beliefs accordingly, the principal offers the choice between a fixed-price and a cost-
plus contract. We are first solving for such continuations before finding the equilibrium
cut-off θ∗1 in the first period. To make the comparison between the case of short-term
contracting and renegotiation relevant, we isolate below conditions under which three
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patterns arise: fixed-price contracts in both periods, a cost-plus followed by a fixed-
price contract and finally cost-plus contracts in both periods.
Second-period contracts. Suppose that a fixed-price contract has been chosen in the first
period, the principal now offers a subsidy b2 that again might split [θ, θ∗1] into two sub-
intervals. In the second period, types with a cost parameter θ ∈ [θ, θ∗2] (where θ∗2 ≤ θ∗1)
choose this fixed-price contract whereas types θ ∈ [θ∗2, θ∗1] operate under a cost-plus
contract. Of course, θ∗2 is again defined as θ∗2 = b2 + k. Following such history, the
second-period welfare becomes:
W2(b2|FP ) =
ˆ b2+k
θ
(S − (1 + λ)b2 + α(b2 + k − θ)) f(θ)
F (θ∗1)
dθ+
ˆ θ∗1
b2+k
(S − (1 + λ)θ) f(θ)
F (θ∗1)
.dθ
(29)
Optimizing this expression, we find:
θ∗2 = min{θF , θ∗1}. (30)
When θ∗1 ≤ θF , all types in [θ, θ∗1] operate under a fixed-price contract also in the second
period. The corresponding subsidy is thus:
θ∗1 = b2 + k.
This scenario replicates a segmentation of the types set which is similar to that arising
in our renegotiation scenario. The difference is that of course the level of the second-
period subsidy might change. It is lower with short-term contracts because the princi-
pal cannot make any commitment to a second-period subsidy in order to compensate
the firm for an earlier choice of a fixed-price contract.
Following the choice of a cost-plus contract in the first period, the principal offers a
subsidy b3 that again splits the set [θ∗1, θ¯] into two sub-intervals. Operators with a type
θ ∈ [θ∗1, θ∗3] (where θ∗3 ≥ θ∗1) choose a fixed-price contract for the second period whereas
those with a type θ ∈ [θ∗3, θ¯] still operate under a cost-plus contract. Again, we have
θ∗3 = b3 + k. The second-period ‘conditional’ welfare becomes:
W2(b3|CP ) =
ˆ b3+k
θ∗1
(S − (1 + λ)b3 + α(b3 + k − θ)) f(θ)
1− F (θ∗1)
dθ+
ˆ θ¯
b3+k
(S − (1 + λ)θ) f(θ)
1− F (θ∗1)
dθ.
(31)
Optimizing this expression yields the cut-off θ∗3 as
k =
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
F (θ∗3)− F (θ∗1)
f(θ∗3)
(32)
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which can be rewritten as (16).
Assuming that not only R(θ) = F (θ)
f(θ)
but also S(θ) = F (θ)−1
f(θ)
are increasing with θ, the
right-hand side of (32) is proportional to (1 − F (θ∗1))R(θ∗3) + F (θ∗1)S(θ∗3) which is also
an increasing function of θ∗3. Hence, (32) admits a unique solution θ∗3 ∈ (θ∗1, θ¯) when:
k <
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
1− F (θ∗1)
f(θ¯)
.
Note also that (32) implies that k <
(
1− α
1+λ
)
R(θ∗3) and thus θ∗3 > θFC .
The optimality condition (32) implies that, viewed as a function of θ∗1, θ∗3 satisfies:
dθ∗3
dθ∗1
=
f(θ∗1)
f(θ∗3)− k1− α
1+λ
f ′(θ∗3)
. (33)
ButR′(θ∗3) > 0 implies
f ′(θ∗3)
f(θ∗3)
< 1
R(θ∗3)
and thus f(θ∗3)− k1− α
1+λ
f ′(θ∗3) > f(θ
∗
3)
(
1− k
(1− α1+λ)R(θ∗3)
)
>
0 which holds since θ∗3 > θFC . Therefore, we have:
dθ∗3
dθ∗1
> 0.
First-period subsidy. The cut-off type θ∗1 must be indifferent between choosing a first-
period fixed-price contract b1 followed by a second-period subsidy b2 + k = θ∗1 that
leaves no extra rent to that type or choosing a cost-plus contract followed by a fixed-
price with subsidy b3. This leads to the indifference condition:
β(b1 + k − θ∗1) = (1− β)(b3 + k − θ∗1)
or using the definition of θ∗3
β(b1 + k − θ∗1) = (1− β)(θ∗3 − θ∗1). (34)
Conditions (32) and (34) define the pair (θ∗1, θ∗3) as a function of b1 only. We shall
make this dependence explicit in what follows. The same remark applies to the second-
period subsidies that are also functions of b1 only. We will thus have:
θ∗1(b1) = b2(b1) + k and θ
∗
3(b1) = b3(b1) + k. (35)
We deduce from the first of those conditions, taken together with (32) and (34) that:
β(b1 − b2(b1)) = (1− β)(θ∗3 − θ∗1) > 0
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and thus
b2(b1) < b1.
The intertemporal welfare can be written as a function of b1 also as:
W(b1) = β
(ˆ θ¯
θ∗1(b1)
(S − (1 + λ)θ)f(θ)dθ +
ˆ θ∗1(b1)
θ
(S − (1 + λ)b1 + α(b1 + k − θ)) f(θ)dθ
)
+(1− β)(F (θ∗1(b1))W2(b2(b1)|FP ) + (1− F (θ∗1(b1)))W2(b3(b1)|CP )). (36)
Using the Envelope Theorem to simplify the impact of b1 on the second period
subsidy, we get:
dW
db1
(b1) = β
(
dθ∗1
db1
(α(b1 + k − θ∗1(b1))− (1 + λ)(b1 − θ∗1(b1)))f(θ∗1(b1)) + (α− 1− λ)F (θ∗1(b1))
)
+(1− β)dθ
∗
1
db1
(((1 + λ)(b3(b1)− θ∗1(b1))− α(b3(b1) + k − θ∗1(b1))) f(θ∗1(b1)).
Simplifying further using (34) yields the following expression:
dW
db1
(b1) = β
(
(α− 1− λ))F (θ∗1(b1)) + (1 + λ)
2β − 1
β
dθ∗1
db1
f(θ∗1(b1))k
)
. (37)
Assuming quasi-concavity of the objective, the optimal first-period subsidy is such
that:
k =
β
2β − 1
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
R(θ∗1(b1))
dθ∗1
db1
(b1)
. (38)
Differentiating (34) with respect to b1 yields:
dθ∗1
db1
=
1
1 + 1−β
β
(
dθ∗3
dθ∗1
− 1
) .
In particular, when β ≥ 1/2 and since dθ∗3
dθ∗1
≥ 0, the optimal cut-off θ∗1(b1) is such that
θ∗1(b1) ≤ θFC as conjectured by our profile.
Note that altogether, (32), (33) and (38) define the cut-offs θ∗1 and θ∗3. From (34) and
(35), we finally get the expression of all subsidies. We can evaluate the probabilities of
each different regimes. Inserting into (36) yields then the expression of the intertempo-
ral welfare with short-term contracts.
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Variables Mean Stand. Dev.
Nominal Subsidy (Euros) 20,702,141 19,239,199
Including Revenue (Euros) 9,608,629 10,526,903
Subsidy per unit of supply (Euro) 0.016 0.005
Real Subsidy (Euros) 18,760,150 17.395,482
Size of the network (km) 288.3 200.1
# of lines 23.6 13.2
# of vehicles 168.1 119.5
# of cities in the urban network 18.3 16.7
Size of population 236,799 177,641
Share of Labor in total costs 0.64 0.10
Share of engineers 0.29
Share right-wing government 0.52
Share Fixed Price contracts 0.55
Share Keolis 0.32
Share Agir 0.16
Share Connex 0.22
Share Transdev 0.24
Table 1: Data
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b b
Variables I II I II
Constant 6.17∗∗∗ 6.39∗∗∗ 7.15∗∗∗ 7.49∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.29) (0.30) (0.33)
Rolling Stock 0.54∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Network Size 0.24∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.07∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Right-Wing -0.06∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Labor Share -1.11∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗ -1.35∗∗∗ -1.35∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17)
Connex 0.07 -0.15
(1.15) (3.02)
Agir -0.7∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07)
Keolis 0.8∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06)
Error Sd. Dev. 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Firms Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Observations 300 300 93 93
Table 2: Estimated Subsidies I
b̂ b̂
Average (1000 Euros) 13487∗∗ 16490∗∗
(6436) (7249)
# of Observations 579 579
Table 3: Estimated Subsidies II
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Social value of effort k
Variables I II III
Agir -0.05 -1.05∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.41) (0.25)
Keolis 0.06 -0.03 0.29∗∗
(0.04) (0.10) (0.11)
Transdev 0.45∗∗∗ 0.37∗ -0.94∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.19) (0.37)
Agir×size 4.08∗∗∗
(1.58)
Keolis×size 0.46
(0.39)
Transdev×size 1.17
(0.78)
Agir×Engineers -3.80∗∗∗
(0.92)
Keolis×Engineers -0.89∗∗
(0.39)
Transdev×Engineers 5.01∗∗∗
(1.57)
First Period Weight β 0.39∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
Mean θ (×10000) 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Stand. Dev. θ (×10000) 0.29∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.14) (0.04)
# of Observations 579
Table 4: Renegotiation-proof: Inefficiency distribution and social value of effort
α×right wing
λ I II III
0.3 1.20∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
# of Observations 392
Table 5: Renegotiation-proof: Parameters of interest in Proposition 2
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Welfare Items Total (in Million Euros)
Subsidy
- Full commitment 33.6
- Renegotiation-proof 27.5
Differential +6.1
Social cost
- Renegotiation-proof 35.7
- Full commitment 43.7
Differential +8.0
Rent operator
- Renegotiation-proof 71.3
- Full commitment 79.5
Differential +8.2
Total welfare
- Renegotiation-proof 50.9
- Full commitment 53.0
Differential +2.1
# of observations 114
Table 6: Welfare differentials for the average network
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